COMMENTS
LUJAN v. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE:
STANDING AS A JUDICIALLY IMPOSED
LIMIT ON LEGISLATIVE POWER
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.t
INTRODUcTION

I find little to quarrel with in Dean Nichol's critique of Justice Scalia's opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.2 I base my
criticisms of the opinion on somewhat different grounds. I am
sympathetic to one version of what Dean Nichol calls Justice
Scalia's "broader agenda" 3-- reducing the role of the judiciary in
making government policy. That agenda antedates Justice Scalia's
appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court; it has been ongoing since
1972.' Many of its central elements have garnered support from
every Justice who has served during the last two decades. 5 However, Justice Scalia's opinion in Defenders cannot be characterized
accurately as part of that agenda. As Dean Nichol recognizes, it
seems to be instead the first step in implementing a quite different
agenda-reducing the permissible role of Congress in government
policymaking.
This is the most basic of several criticisms I have of the opinion. I make three main points in this Comment. The first is that
Justice Scalia's opinion in Defenders is an insupportable judicial

t Paul J. Kellner Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.S. 1965, Lehigh University; J.D. 1972, University of Virginia. This Comment is based on remarks presented
at a symposium on Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife held at Duke University School of
Law on January 21, 1993. I am grateful to Peter Strauss and Henry Monaghan for their
helpful comments on an earlier version of this Comment.
1. Gene R. 'Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE

LJ. 1141 (1993).
2.
3.
4.
5:

112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992).
Nichol, supra note 1, at 1166.
See infra text accompanying notes 124-38.
See cases cited infra notes 125-38.
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contraction of the legislative power to make judicially enforceable
policy decisions.6 As such, it is readily distinguishable both from
prior opinions in which the Court has reduced the scope of review
of agency policy decisions and from prior opinions in which the
Court has held that plaintiffs lacked standing to obtain judicial
review of agency policy decisions. Second, if the Court were to
interpret and apply the broad reasoning in Defenders in all cases,
the opinion would be the source of widespread harm to the process of agency policymaking, reducing dramatically the range of
interests effectively represented in most agency proceedings.7
That, in turn, would increase significantly the tendency for agency
policies to be distorted by factionalism. Third, the opinions in
Defenders are difficult to interpret! A majority of the Justices
held unconstitutional as applied the statutory provision explicitly
authorizing judicial review of an agency rule at the behest of
Defenders of Wildlife. The nature of the constitutional defect,
however, is difficult to identify. Plausible interpretations of the
defect include: Plaintiff's choice of an inappropriate affiant; the
affiant's failure to purchase a plane ticket; inadequate legislative
specification of the purpose of the statute; or the existence of
strict constitutional limits on Congress's power to authorize the
courts to enforce statutory commands against agencies. The uncertainty is in itself a problem; many of the plausible interpretations
are themselves very problematic.
I. WHAT IS

THE H-OLDING IN DEFENDERS?

The Endangered Species Act (the Act) requires federal agencies to consult with the Department of the Interior (the Department) to "insure [sic] that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely to jeopardize the contin-

ued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or
result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such
species which is determined by the Secretary ... to be critical . . . ." After years of controversy and vacillation on the issue,

the Department issued a rule stating that the Act does not apply

6.
7.
8.
9.

See infra text accompanying notes 139-47.
See infra text accompanying notes 119-23.
See infra text accompanying notes 13-103.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
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to federal agency projects undertaken in foreign nations. The rule
thus permitted federal agencies to fund foreign projects without
first consulting with the Department to determine whether the
projects would have an effect on endangered species, an effect
that would have prohibited funding if the projects were undertaken in the United States.
The Endangered Species Act explicitly authorizes "any person" to obtain judicial review of an agency action that allegedly
violates the Act." Under this provision, Defenders of Wildlife
sought judicial review of the Department rule. It claimed to have
standing deriving from the injuries to two of its members." Each
member submitted an affidavit alleging that: (1) Each had a personal and professional interest in observing a particular endangered species (the Nile crocodile and the Asian leopard, respectively); (2) each had visited the habitat of that species in the past;
(3) each planned to visit the habitat to attempt to observe the
species in the future; (4) each species' habitat was threatened by
specific projects that federal agencies had agreed to fund (in
Egypt and Sri Lanka, respectively); and, (5) each affiant was injured by the rule because it would allow federal agencies to fund
projects that threatened the habitat of endangered species the
affiants wanted to observe in the future to further their personal
and professional interests.'
A six-Justice majority held that Defenders of Wildlife lacked
standing to seek review of the rule. Since the statute explicitly
conferred standing on "any person" to obtain judicial review of a
Department rule pursuant to the Act, t 3 the majority necessarily
held the statute unconstitutional as applied. Because of its multiple
opinions, however, the case raises more questions than it resolves.
Justices Kennedy and Souter, who joined in other portions of the
majority opinion, declined to join that portion dealing with
redressability. The two wrote a separate concurrence that differs
14
with the majority opinion in other important respects as well.

10. Id. § 1540(g).
11. The Court permits associations to assert the interests of their members as a basis
for standing. See, e.g., UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274 (1986); Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). See generally RICHARD PIERCE ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.4.8 (2d ed. 1992).
12. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2138 (1992).
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988).
14. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2146 (Kennedy and Souter, JJ., concurring in part and
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Justice Stevens concluded that Defenders of Wildlife had standing
to obtain review of the rule but concurred separately in the judgment based on his conclusion that the rule was consistent with the
Act." Two dissenting Justices disagreed with every aspect of the
majority opinion's reasoning.' 6
The dissenting Justices accused Justice Scalia of mounting "a
slash-and-bum expedition through the law of environmental standing."' 7 In one sense, that characterization understates the potential significance of his opinion. Much of the reasoning in the opinion is generally applicable to all standing disputes; the opinion
could foreshadow major changes in standing law outside the field
of environmental regulation. 8 In another sense, the dissenting
Justices' characterization of the majority opinion is unduly harsh.
The opinion includes a great deal of new reasoning about the law
of standing. The quality of that reasoning varies widely, however,
ranging from a well-reasoned explanation of a relationship the
Court had never previously addressed, 9 to reasoning
that is in20
consistent with the basic tenets of our legal system.
The majority opinion's conclusion relies on six lines of reasoning: (1) A finding that the plaintiff had tendered inadequate proof
of imminent, judicially cognizable injury in fact;2' (2) a conclusion
that the statutory provision explicitly conferring standing on "any
person" was unconstitutional as applied;' (3) a rejection of the
plaintiff's alleged injuries based on ecosystem nexus, animal nexus,
and professional nexus; (4) a determination that judicial action
would not redress the plaintiff's injuries;24 (5) a conclusion that
the plaintiff's procedural injury was not sufficient alone to satisfy
the requirements for standing; and (6) a judgment that permitting judicial review at the plaintiff's behest would violate the "take

concurring in the judgment).
15. Id. at 2147.
16. Id. at 2151 (Blackmun and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).

17. Id. at 2160.
18. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 107-19.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 87-93.

20. See infra text accompanying notes 93-103.
21.

Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2138.

22. Id. at 2142-46.
23. Id. at 2139-40.
24.

Id. at 2140-42.

25. Id. at 2142-43.
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Care" clause and separation of powers.26 Only the first two of
these clearly elicited the support of all six Justices who joined in
portions of the majority opinion.
A. Inadequate Proof of Judicially Cognizable Injury
The first of these lines of reasoning (and the first of two
which clearly garnered a majority) provides the most narrow potential interpretation of the case; namely, that the plaintiff submitted insufficient evidence to support a finding that one of its
members would suffer imminent, judicially cognizable injury in
fact. The Court began by enumerating the characteristics of an
injury that make it judicially cognizable. The injury must be "concrete and particularized," as well -as "actual or imminent, not
'conjectural' or 'hypothetical."' 2 The opinion concluded that the
affidavits failed to meet these standards. The critical deficiency in
proof was temporal; the Court held that an expression of an intent
to observe a species or its habitat in the future "is simply not
enough" to meet the imminent injury standard.' To meet the
Court's criteria, one of the affiants presumably was required to
testify to her intent to visit the habitat at a specific date in the
near future or even to evidence her intent to do so by purchasing
a plane ticket. This part of the Court's reasoning is questionable
on four grounds.
First, the Court has only required an injury to be "concrete,"
"particularized," and "imminent" in some cases, and even then,
the nature of the injury required to warrant these subjective,
conclusory characterizations has varied considerably from case to
case.29 The Court has recognized many forms of injury that could
fairly be characterized as "abstract and general," at least when
Congress statutorily recognizes those forms of injury. In Trafficante
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,' for instance, the Court held
that exclusion of non-whites from an apartment complex sufficiently injured white residents because it deprived them of the social

26. Id. at 2144-46.

27. Id. at 2136.
28. Id. at 2138.
29. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.4.4; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the
Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239,

1276 (1989).
30. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
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benefits of living in a racially integrated community. Similarly, in
Heckler v. Mathews,3' the Court held that gender discrimination
with no tangible adverse effect constituted injury sufficient to support standing 2
The Court has also found many injuries that can fairly be
characterized as "conjectural," rather than "actual" or "imminent,"
sufficient to support standing once again when Congress has so
ordained. In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations
v. Camp,33 for instance, the Court held that an independent data
processing firm had alleged economic injury sufficient to confer on
it standing to obtain judicial review of an agency rule authorizing
banks to provide data processing services. Yet, ex ante, it was
impossible to conclude with any degree of confidence that any
particular data processing firm would suffer economic injury. To
do so would require the Court to determine which banks, if any,
would take advantage of the opportunity to compete with data
processing companies, and which data processing companies, if
any, would experience diminished net revenues attributable to that
competition. The Court saw no need to answer those questions.
The companion case of Barlow v. Collins' involved an even
more "conjectural" injury. There, the Court allowed a tenant farmer to obtain judicial review of an agency rule permitting the tenant
farmer to use the expected proceeds from future crops as loan
collateral. The Court found injury attributable to the unproven
assertion that the agency, by giving the tenant farmer greater
freedom, in fact increased the power of the farmer's landlord to
extract unfavorable terms from the tenant. 5
Second, the Court should not require evidentiary proof of
particularized injury as a prerequisite to judicial review of all

31. 465 U.S. 728 (1984).
32. Id. at 737-40; see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982)
(finding misrepresentation that no apartment was available was sufficient injury even
though plaintiff actually did not want an apartment); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (finding sufficient spiritual injury attributable to leaving class during
Bible reading); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (finding sufficient spiritual injury attributable to leaving class during prayer).
33. 397 U.S. 150 (1970); see also Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388
(1987); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1970); Arnold Tours v. Camp, 400

U.S. 45 (1970); American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 364 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1960).
34. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
35. Id. at 163-67.
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agency actions. The Court has suggested the need for such proof
in dicta in only a handful of cases, beginning with its 1978 opinion
in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group.36 In
other cases, the Court has resolved the injury question based
solely on its evaluation of the pleadings.37 Requiring concrete,
evidentiary proof of particularized injury makes little sense when a
party seeks judicial review of a general rule. Consider, for instance, a petition to review an Environmental Protection Agency
rule that would have the uncontroverted effect of increasing emissions of sulfur dioxide in the Midwest. Assume that the petitioner
is a resident of the Northeast who regularly travels to several
specific lakes in the Adirondacks to trout fish, and he alleges
injury in that reduced trout populations diminish his pleasure in
trout fishing. The general relationship between sulfur oxide emissions in the Midwest and reduced trout populations in the
Adirondacks is' well-documented.38 It is impossible, however, to
prove or disprove the relationship on a particularized basis, that is,
to prove that any particular individual will catch fewer trout in
any particular lake as a result of any particular agency action
authorizing increased sulfur oxide emissions. Virtually all broadly
applicable agency actions present the same problem. A requirement of evidentiary proof of particularized injury in this recurring
type of situation is functionally indistinguishable from holding that
no one has standing to seek review of an agency action that injures everyone. The Court has repeatedly rejected that proposition.39
Generalized allegations of logically plausible forms of individual injury should be sufficient to establish standing to obtain re36.
885-89
37.
38.

438 U.S. 59 (1978); see also Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871,
(1990).
See, e.g., Barlow, 397 U.S. at 164; Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153-55.
Office of the Director of Research of the National Acid Precipitation Assessment

Program, NATIONAL ACID PRECIPITATION AssEssMENT PROGRAM ACIDIC DEPosmON:

STATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (1990) (a four-volume report of a federal study of
acid rain completed at a cost of $500 million). These general relationships are classic
legislative facts. The Court has consistently held that legislative facts can be resolved
without conducting an oral evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Florida E.
Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 244-46 (1973); see also 2 KENNETH C. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.3 (2d ed. 1979).
39. See, eg., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687-88 (1973); see also Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2147 (1992) ("[I]t does not matter how many
persons have been injured by the challenged action .... ") (Kennedy and Souter, JJ.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

STANDING AS A LIMIT

1993]

1177

view of agency actions that have broad effects on the public.
Judge Frank provided the analytical foundation for this proposition in his famous opinion announcing the "private Attorney Generals" theory of standing.' Because Congress has the power to
direct the Attorney General to bring suit to protect the public
interest in an agency action, it can authorize such public interest
suits by any "person aggrieved" by the agency action instead.41
Third, the Court's reliance on a deficiency of detailed proof in
the plaintiff's affidavits as the basis for the holding in Defenders
seems trivial. At any given point in time, many people have specific plans to visit the habitat of the Nile crocodile and the Asian
leopard, and most would be happy to submit an affidavit as a
member of Defenders of Wildlife. What purpose is served by
requiring the organization to expend significant resources to find
the "right" affiant when there is every reason to believe that such
people exist and that they share the organization's opposition to
the challenged action? It is also hard to take seriously this narrow
basis for the decision in Defenders given the extraordinarily broad
alternative reasons stated in the opinion. It seems unlikely that the
authors of the opinion would withdraw their broad conclusions-for example, their reasoning based on the "take Care"
clause-if one of the affiants were to buy a plane ticket to Egypt
or Sri Lanka.
Finally, the opinion's inadequate proof of injury basis is premised on an extraordinarily narrow conception of the nature of
the injury required to support standing in a case like Defenders. I
will suggest broader definitions of injury that are more appropriate
to the circumstances, at least when Congress statutorily ordains.42
B.

The Conclusion That the Statute Was Unconstitutional as Applied

The
garnered
statutory
cy action

only other portion of the majority opinion that clearly
the support of six Justices was the conclusion that the
provision authorizing "any person" to challenge an agenthat violates the Endangered Species Act was unconstitu-

40. See Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S.
707 (1943).
41. Id. at 704.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 68-79.
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tional as applied. The Court had never before held unconstitutional a statutory provision that authorized judicial review of an agency action at the behest of members of a statutorily specified class.
Indeed, the Court had consistently respected indications of congressional intent to confer standing on individuals with particular
interests in the outcome of agency proceedings.43
Cass Sunstein's account of the history of the law of standing
demonstrates the extent of the Court's departure from history and
tradition in Defenders." Eighteenth century British and American
courts routinely entertained a variety of "citizen suit" actions
analogous to the class of judicial proceedings Congress authorized
in the Endangered Species Act. 45 That practice continued in various forms in both U.S. federal and state courts in the period following the drafting of the Constitution. 4 Standing originated as a
prudential doctrine intended to limit the potential for judicial
intrusion into areas more appropriately governed by the politically
accountable institutions of government.' As such, it obviously
had no application to judicial actions specifically authorized by
statute. Rather, it simply limited judicial discretion to interfere
with actions authorized or taken by politically accountable institutions.4 Prior to 1992, the Court had referred to standing as a
potential constitutional constraint in 117 cases, but all 117 of these
were decided after 1940; the majority-109-were decided after
1965.49 Moreover, until Defenders, the Court had never actually

43. See Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984); Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,
438 U.S. 59 (1978); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940). See generally KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD
J. PIERCE, AwMsImTRATIvw LAw TREATISE § 16.8 (3d ed. forthcoming 1993); PIERCE ET
AL, supra note 11, § 5.4.
44. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,"
and Article Ii, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992). For other good historical accounts, see
Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78
YALE LU. 816 (1969); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and
When, 82 YALE LJ. 1363 (1973); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of
Article III, 74 CAL. L REv. 1915 (1986); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing
and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
45. See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 170-74.
46. See id. at 173-77.
47. See id. at 179-81.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 169.
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used standing as a basis to hold unconstitutional a statute authorizing the judiciary to resolve a class of disputes. 5° Lower courts
were unanimous in holding that statutory provisions explicitly
authorizing citizen suits to challenge agency actions were constitutional without the need to find -that the plaintiff had suffered a
particular
type of injury as a result of the agency action at is51
sue.
Until Defenders, the Court deferred to congressional intent
with respect to standing where it was able to discern that intent.5 2 If, as Defenders suggests, the Court now believes that
standing creates a judicially enforceable limit on congressional
discretion, rather than a prudential limit on judicial discretion,
both the reasoning and the results of the Court's prior statutory

standing cases are in grave doubt.53
It is hard to determine the scope and likely effects of the
holding of unconstitutionality, however, because the majority opinion and the concurring opinion seem to rely on different reasoning
to support that holding. The majority opinion refers to proof of

"concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent" injury as
"an essential and unchanging part of the case or controversy requirement of Article III."' Interestingly, the oldest of the six
cases cited for that proposition was decided in 1972. 5s In none of
those cases did the Court apply that "essential and unchanging"
constitutional requirement as the basis for holding a statute unconstitutional. 56 The Court could not support its assertion in Defenders by citing older cases because its assertion is false. It could not
cite any case with a holding that supports its assertion because no

50. See id. at 165.
51. See, eg., Friends of Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975); City of Chicago v.
General Motors Corp., 467 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1972); Sunstein, supra note 44, at 165
n.10.
52. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345-48, 352-53 (1984); Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72-81 (1978); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S. 205, 210-12 (1972); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 155-56 (1970); FCC v. Sander Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 473-76 (1940).
53. See infra Part II.
54. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992).
55. Ld. at 2136 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)).
56. See DAvIs & PIERcE, supra note 43, §§ 16.1, 16.4, 16.5, 16.7, 16.8.
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such case exists. In each of the cited cases, the statement was pure
dicta.
The majority opinion then applies the tests announced in dicta
in a few recent cases to support its conclusion that Article III
precludes Congress from conferring standing on someone who
does not meet the demanding tests the Court had previously announced as a limit on judicial discretion.' The majority opinion
acknowledges the many prior cases in which the Court had held
that "[tjhe . . . injury required by Art. III may exist solely by

virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing."'", It concludes that the citizen suit provision does
not fall into this category, however, because statutory "broadening
[of] the categories of injury that may be alleged in support of
standing is a different matter from abandoning the requirement
that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury.,, 59 That statement was dispositive of the constitutional issue,
however, only because the majority opinion rejects as "beyond all
reason" plaintiff's arguments that it suffered broader forms of
injury based on its three nexus theories.'
In their separate concurrence, Justices Kennedy and Souter
discussed the relationship between a broad statutory grant of
standing and the requirement of injury in a way that helps to
identify the constitutional flaw they see in the Endangered Species
Act's citizen suit provision. They agree with the majority "that
there is an outer limit to the power of Congress to confer rights
of action,, 61 and "that it would exceed those limitations if, at the
behest of Congress and in the absence of any concrete showing of
injury, we were to entertain citizen suits."'6 2 They explicitly acknowledge Congress's power to confer standing by statute, however, in four ways. First, they express their continuing agreement
with the Court's prior holdings that "it does not matter how many
persons have been injured by the challenged action., 61 Second,

57. Defenders, 112 S.Ct. at 2137-46.
58. Id. at 2145 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (quoting Linda
R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973))).
59. Id. at 2145-46 (quoting Morton, 405 U.S. at 738).
60. Id. at 2139-40.
61. Id. at 2147 (Kennedy and Souter, JJ.,
concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
62.

Id.

63. Id.
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they recognize that regulatory regimes often create judicially enforceable statutory rights that differ from traditional common law
rights.' Third, they reaffirm Congress's authority to create rights
of action by statute by defining injuries and causal relationships.'
Finally, the concurring Justices identify a narrow flaw in the citizen suit provision of the Act that may explain their conclusion
that the provision is unconstitutional: "Congress must ... identify
the injury ... and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled

to bring suit." 66
The reasoning of the concurring Justices is hard to reconcile
with the Court's general approach to challenges to the constitutionality of federal statutes. Except perhaps when legislation involves suspect categories or fundamental rights, the Court normally does not require the legislature to include in-a statute the findings and reasoning necessary to sustain it against constitutional
attack. Rather, the Court traditionally has held legislation constitutional if it advances any permissible and plausible legislative purpose, whether or not the legislature stated that purpose in the
statute.67 Since a broad grant of standing to challenge an agency
rule does not raise concerns about fundamental rights or suspect
categories, the Court's (and here specifically the two concurring
Justices') unwillingness to accord Congress the degree of deference
customarily due seems inappropriate.
In any event, unlike the constitutional flaw identified in the
majority opinion, the constitutional flaw identified by the concurring Justices is easy to correct. Congress need only identify or
create a general public interest in endangered species, and provide
explicitly that the deprivation of that interest constitutes an injury
that a federal court must vindicate at the behest of any citizen.
Cass Sunstein suggests two easy ways Congress could accomplish
this. First, it could provide explicitly that all citizens "have a kind
of property right-a tenancy in common-in some environmental

64. Id. at 2146 ("[W]e must be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action
that do not have clear analogs in our common-law tradition.").
65. Id. at 2146-47 ("Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains
of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before . .

").

66. Id. at 2147.
67. See, eg., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW §§ 15-9 to -10, at 1436-46 (2d ed. 1988).
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asset," for example, endangered species. Second, Congress could
provide a nominal bounty for any citizen who brings a successful
action to enforce the Act.' Even the majority opinion in Defenders recognized that a cash bounty would confer on plaintiffs sufficient personal interest to satisfy Article III.70 Alternatively, Congress could adopt by statute one or more of the "nexus" theories
of injury that the plaintiff in Defenders advanced. The majority
opinion refused to accept those theories, but the Court would be
stretching its power beyond the breaking point if it were to reject
as "irrational" a congressional finding that citizens are injured in
one of these ways by the loss of endangered species. The concurring Justices explicitly acknowledged that "in different circumstances a nexus theory similar to those proffered here might support a
claim to standing."'
C.

Rejection of the Nexus Theories

The plaintiff urged three "nexus" theories in support of its
argument that its affiant-members would suffer imminent injury
attributable to projects that would adversely affect endangered
species.' "Ecosystem nexus" hypothesizes that a project that impairs a portion of an integrated ecosystem injures anyone who
uses any part of that ecosystem.73 "Animal nexus" hypothesizes
that a project that adversely affects the survival of an endangered
species injures anyone who has an interest in observing the species
at any location, for example, a zoo.74 "Vocational nexus" hypothesizes that a project that adversely affects the survival of endangered species injures anyone who has a professional interest in
endangered species, for example, as a zookeeper or as a research
biologist. 5 The majority opinion rejects these theories as "beyond
all reason."'7 6 Three Justices accepted the theories,7 7 however,

68. Sunstein, supra note 44, at 234.
69. id. at 232.
70. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2143.

71. Id. at 2146 (Kennedy and Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
72. Id. at 2139-40.
73. Id at 2139.

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77.

Id. at 2148-49 (Stevens, ., concurring); id. at 2154 (Blackmun and O'Connor, J.,
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and two others indicated that they might be receptive to them "in
other circumstances."' It seems unlikely, then, that a majority of
Justices would be willing to characterize as "irrational," and hence
unconstitutional, a legislative finding that individuals suffer harm
under one or all of the three nexus theories. To do so, the Court
would have to characterize as "irrational" congressional adoption
of theories of biodiversity that many scientists accept,7 9 as well as
the commonsense notion that a biologist who has devoted a lifetime to study of the Asian leopard is injured when the last leopard meets its demise.
D. Lack of Redressability
The opinion also concludes that the plaintiff lacked standing
because any injury its members might suffer would not be judicially redressable.' That determination is functionally equivalent to a
conclusion that the challenged agency action has an insufficient
causal relationship to the injury the plaintiff alleged.8 ' Only three
Justices joined Scalia in the portion of the opinion on redressability, however.
The opinion concluded that any injury the plaintiff might
suffer was not redressable for two reasons. First, because the Department of the Interior was the only agency that was a party to
the case, a judicial opinion holding that the Endangered Species
Act requires agencies to consult with the Department before funding overseas projects that are likely to have adverse effects on
endangered species would bind only the Department and not
other agencies. Thus, other federal agencies would be free to
ignore the Court's decision if it were to invalidate the
Department's rule. That reasoning is inconsistent with precedent.' More fundamentally, it ignores the reality that all federal
agencies routinely conform their conduct to decisions of the Sudissenting).
78. Id. at 2146 (Kennedy and Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
79. See e.g., EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSIY OF LIFE (1992).
80. Defenders, 112 S.Ct. at 2140-42.
81. See PIERCE Er AL, supra note 11, § 5.4.6.
82. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402-03 (1940) (stating
that a decision against one government agency estops all others because there is privity
between officers of the same government); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
694-96 (1974) (reasoning that agency rules are binding on the executive branch).
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preme Court. If the Court were to hold that agencies must consult
with the Department of the Interior, the agencies would do so.
The opinion itself recognizes that the applicable standard is whether a judicial decision is "likely" to redress the plaintiff's injury. s3
Is the Court seriously suggesting that federal agencies are unlikely
to comply with a Supreme Court decision?
Second, the opinion concluded that the injury was not
redressable because the U.S. government provides only partial
funding for overseas projects. Thus, a foreign government could
take the injury-producing actions without American funding. The
dissenting Justices devastated that reasoning, pointing out that:
The partial funding of one of- the projects amounted to $170 million iii aid to a country with an annual Gross National Product of
only $6 billion;' an agency need not provide 100% funding of a
project in order to be able to influence the manner in which the
project is implemented;' and both the Sri Lankan and Egyptian
governments had specifically requested the assistance of the U.S.
government in devising means of mitigating the potential adverse
effects of the projects on endangered species before the Department issued the challenged rule that rendered the Act inapplicable
to those projects."
E. ProceduralInjury
The majority opinion also addressed an issue that previously
had not received the attention it warrants: In what circumstances
can a plaintiff obtain judicial review of an agency action based on
an injury to "procedural rights"? The question is important because a high proportion of all administrative law disputes that
courts resolve are premised on "procedural" injuries. Typically, a
plaintiff alleges denial of adequate notice, an adequate hearing, or
an adequate explanation of the basis for an agency action adverse
to that party's interests and seeks review based on the (usually implicit) assumption that the agency's provision of the mandatory

83. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2136.
84. Id. at 2157 (Blackmun and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
85. Id. at 2156-57 ("Even if the action agencies supply only a fraction of the funding
for a particular foreign project, it remains at least a question for the finder of fact
whether threatened withdrawal of that fraction would affect foreign government conduct
to avoid harm to listed species.").
86. Id. at 2157.
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procedure would be likely to affect the outcome of the case.' If
the majority opinion in Defenders has rejected standing based on
such procedural injuries, the field of administrative law will have
lost most of its content. Moreover, because most limits on agency
discretion are procedural, agencies will enjoy nearly unlimited
discretion."
The dissenting Justices severely criticized the majority
opinion's treatment of procedural injury as if the Court had eliminated standing based on procedural injury.89 That criticism is misplaced. The majority opinion concludes that a person cannot obtain judicial review of an agency action based only on injury to a
"procedural right." The Court explains and qualifies that conclusion in several important ways:
This is not a case where plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a procedural requirement the disregard of which could impair a separate
concrete interest of theirs ...
There is this much truth to the assertion that "procedural
rights" are special: The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right
without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and
immediacy. Thus,... one.., has standing to challenge ... [an]
agency's failure to ... [follow a procedure] . . . even though he
cannot establish with any certainty that [the procedure will
change the outcome of the case].9'
... We do not hold that an individual cannot enforce procedural rights; he assuredly can, so long as the procedures in

87. See, eg., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 345-46
(1989); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 46
(1983); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 324-25, 343 (1976).
88. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in
Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L REV. 469, 473-81 (1985); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald
Elliot, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990
DUKE LJ. 984, 1033.
89. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2157-60 (Blackmun and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting). It is
possible that the dissent addressed its criticism only to the majority opinion's discussion
of procedural injury. The harsh tone of the dissenting opinion suggests that Justice Scalia
may have added the important qualifications regarding procedural rights in footnotes 7
and 8 in response to the dissenting opinion.
90. Id. at 2142.
91. Id. at 2142 n.7.
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question are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing.'
With these qualifications, the majority opinion's
cedural injuries seems well-reasoned, although
characterization problems in some contexts.'
flaws in the majority opinion lie instead in its
stantive injury.

treatment of proit raises difficult
The fundamental
treatment of sub-

F. Separation of Powers
Finally, the majority opinion relied on separation of powers
and the "take Care" clause of Article II to support its conclusion
that Defenders of Wildlife lacked standing. The opinion refers to
cases in which the Court declined to permit a plaintiff to challenge
government conduct on constitutional grounds where no statute
authorized judicial intervention.9 4 It then extended the reasoning
of those cases to situations in which Congress has explicitly authorized judicial review of agency action by statute:
To be sure, our generalized-grievance cases have typically involved Government violation of procedures assertedly ordained
by the Constitution rather than the Congress. But there is absolutely no basis for making the Article III inquiry turn on the
source of the asserted right.
. . . To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated
public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into
an "individual right" vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief
Executive's most important constitutional duty, to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed." It would enable the courts,
with the permission of Congress, "to assume a position of au-

92. Id. at 2143 n.8.
93. See, eg., infra text accompanying notes 107-11.
94. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2143-44 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149
(1990); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166 (1974); Doremus v. Board of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429 (1952); Ex
parte L6vitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Fairchild
v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922)).
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thority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department .... "9
This reasoning is both extraordinary and revealing. In several
prior cases, the Court used standing to preclude federal courts
from relying on some of the broad language of the Constitution as
a source of judicially enforceable constraints on government policies.9 Its choice of doctrines was unfortunate, since the Court
obviously was not concerned in those cases with the only question
standing should answer-who can obtain review of an otherwise
reviewable actionY Rather, the effect of the holding in each case
was to preclude anyone from obtaining review on the grounds the
petitioner asserted." However, the Court has good reason to limit
the scope of potential judicial involvement in government through
use of some appropriate doctrine. If the Supreme Court were to
authorize federal courts to review each congressional enactment or
federal agency action to determine whether, for instance, it is
consistent with the vague language of the Tenth Amendment-the
issue in Frothingham v. Mellon9--it would create a significant
risk that in "interpreting" the Tenth Amendment, judges would
begin to impose their own versions of federalism. Judicial attempts
to give meaning to the malleable language of the Constitution in
all contexts could easily evolve into a situation in which politically
unaccountable judges displace the politically accountable institutions of government as the source of a high proportion of policy
decisions. Thus, in its constitutional standing cases, the Court was
exercising judicial restraint in order to further what Alexander
Bickel refers to as the "passive virtues."1"
In Defenders, however, the Court for the first time transposed
this method of avoiding judicial involvement in some classes of
disputes into contexts in which Congress has limited agency action
by statute and has explicitly called on federal courts to enforce
that statutory limit against agencies.1"' The reasoning in this, part

95. Id. at 2144-45 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Frothingham,262 U.S. at 489).
96. Se4

e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 737; Warth v. Seldin, 422

U.S. 490 (1975);

Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 447.
97. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 43, §§ 16.4, 16.5, 16.7.
98. Id.
99. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
100. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 113-23 (1986).
101. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2144-45 (1992).
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of the opinion suggested strongly that the Court's goal is not just
to limit the number of people who can bring judicial actions of the
type at issue in Defenders, but to avoid all judicial involvement in
this class of disputes. It is hard to take seriously the suggestion in
the first part of the opinion that the plaintiff would have had
standing if only one of its members had purchased a plane ticket
to Egypt1° when, at the end of the opinion, the Court relied on
the "take Care" clause as the basis for its conclusion that Congress
cannot transfer power from the President to the courts by enacting
a statute that purports to create judicially enforceable limits on the
discretion of agencies."
II. POTENTIAL EFFECrs OF DEFENDERS
Because of the multiple opinions and multiple lines of reasoning in Defenders, it is impossible to predict with confidence the
scope and effect of the holding. In this Part, I will describe four
potential effects of Defenders, assuming that a majority of the
Court accepts the broad reasoning in the majority opinion and
applies that reasoning routinely to resolve all future statutory
standing disputes. From my perspective, this is a most pessimistic
assumption. I certainly hope the Court interprets the olbinion in
one of the more narrow ways suggested in Part I. However, a
worst-case scenario is illustrative of the opinion's many potential
problems.
The holding in Defenders that the citizen suit provision of the
Endangered Species Act was unconstitutional as applied has the
potential to change the world of administrative law in many important respects. First, scores of environmental statutes have citizen suit provisions." If the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act is unconstitutional, there is reason to doubt the
constitutionality of all other such provisions." Moreover, if the
citizen suit provision in a statute like the Clean Air Act" is un-

102. See id. at 2138.
103. Id. at 2144-45.
104. See eg., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1988); Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1988), Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972, 9659, 11046 (1988).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988).
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constitutional, will anyone other than a regulated firm have standing to seek judicial review of a broadly applicable rule governing
emissions levels or ambient air standards? Can anyone other than
a regulated firm prove "concrete and particularized" injury? The
reasoning in Defenders could produce a situation in which no
intended beneficiary of an environmental statute has standing to
obtain judicial review of a broadly applicable rule.
Second, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) confers on
"any person" a judicially enforceable statutory right to obtain
nonexempt information in an agency's possession." The reasoning in Defenders could easily support a holding that FOIA's "any
person" standard is unconstitutional. Who can prove "concrete and
particularized" injury attributable to an agency's refusal to provide
information? Surely not "any person." Is the statutory right to
obtain information under FOIA substantive, or is it merely a "procedural right, '' lts the denial of which will support standing only if
it threatens a "concrete and particularized" substantive injury? Can
a reporter or an academic researcher prove "concrete and particularized" injury, or is any injury she suffers too "abstract," "generalized," and "conjectural" to support standing? Perhaps her only
interest is derivative of the general public's interest in knowing
what the government is doing. If so, that would seem to be an
"undifferentiated public interest" that Congress cannot convert
"into an 'individual right' vindicable in the courts."'"
Will every request to obtain information under FOIA require
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the individual making
the request will suffer a "concrete and particularized" injury to an
individual substantive right if the agency declines to provide the
information?"1 Who will conduct such hearings? If they are con107. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988). I am grateful to Peter Strauss for suggesting the
relationship between the opinion in Defenders and FOIA.
108. Distinguishing between procedural and substantive rights is notoriously difficult.
See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
109. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2145 (1992).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39. Because the majority opinion in Defenders suggests that a plaintiff must prove injury, causation, and redressability in an
evidentiary hearing in every case where the government contests the plaintiff's standing,
each of the questions posed in this part of the Court's opinion applies to all contested
standing cases. In many cases, the merits are easier to resolve than the standing issue.
Consider, for instance, the complicated issues discussed in the inconclusive forty-four page
debate of an evenly divided en banc federal appellate court in Center for Auto Safety v.
Thomas, 847 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 856 F.2d 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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ducted by an agency that desires not to provide the information,
how long might it take for the agency to issue a final order resolving the standing dispute based on an evidentiary hearing? In what
proportion of cases will an agency that is reluctant to provide
information find that the person who requests the information has
a right to receive it because she will otherwise suffer a "concrete
and particularized" injury to her individual substantive rights? Will
reviewing courts accord agency findings of fact relevant to standing
the same high degree of deference they routinely accord all other
agency findings?
This series of rhetorical questions is meant to suggest that
agencies should not be authorized to conduct standing hearings in
FOIA cases. Agencies reluctant to disclose information would have
a powerful incentive both to stall and to find that the requester
does not have standing. The only other alternative consistent with
the majority opinion in Defenders raises other serious questions,
however. Can the already overburdened district courts conduct
evidentiary hearings to resolve FOIA standing disputes in the
predictably large number of cases in which agencies challenge an
individual's assertion that she will suffer a "concrete and particularized" injury if she does not receive the requested information?
How long will such cases take to resolve? What effect will they
have on the expected value of information requested under FOIA
and on the expected cost of obtaining such information? What
effect will such a dramatic change in expectations have on the efficacy of FOIA? It is not difficult to predict the answers to these
questions; FOIA could become de facto a statute that merely authorizes agencies to provide requested information when they
choose to do so.
Third, the broad reasoning in Defenders would have major
effects beyond environmental law and FOIA law. Over the last
twenty-five years, the Court's opinions resolving standing disputes
have divided into two distinct categories. In cases in which no
statute bears on the standing issue, and in which the Court is
reluctant to authorize federal judicial intervention, the Court uses

In many contexts, there is no judicial forum available to conduct an evidentiary
hearing on standing. The federal appellate courts, which have exclusive responsibility to

review most broadly applicable agency actions, are institutionally incapable of conducting
evidentiary hearings. See, e.g., Investment Co. Inst. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 551 F.2d 1270, 1278-80 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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standing to preclude review.' In this line of cases, the Court
describes the nature of the injury required to obtain standing in
narrow terms, for example, "particularized and concrete" injury to
individual substantive rights. It then applies extraordinarily demanding tests to determine whether the government action at issue
caused such a narrowly defined injury and whether a judicial reversal of that action would redress any such narrowly defined
injury. These tests are obviously designed to be impossible to
satisfy, and in fact have precluded plaintiffs from meeting the
jurisdictional predicate for federal judicial intervention in those
classes of disputes.
Warth v. Seldin"' illustrates this approach- to standing. Four
different groups of plaintiffs sought judicial review of local zoning
rules specifying minimum lot sizes and minimum floor space. The
plaintiffs alleged that the zoning rules violated the Fourteenth
Amendment because they had the purpose and effect of excluding
all poor people and most black people from living in. the community. The alleged injuries seemed entirely plausible: Poor people
who wanted to live in the community could not afford to do so;
builders who wanted to construct low-cost housing suffered economic injury because their construction permit applications were
routinely denied on the basis of the zoning rules; neighboring
communities suffered harm to their tax base and their social service budget because they were required to absorb a disproportionate share of the region's poor families. The effects of exclusionary
Yet, the Court combined a narzoning are well-documented.'
row definition of judicially cognizable injury-that is, "actual or
imminent," "concrete and particularized"-and an extraordinarily
demanding test of causality and redressability14to support its holding that none of the petitioners had standing.

111. See, ag., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973).
112. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
113. See generally Report by the Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing Before the Subcomm. on Policy Research and Insurance and the
Subcomm. on Housing and Community Development, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (examining the role of local government land use regulations and their impact on low and
moderate income persons); Bernard J. Frieden, The Exclusionary Effect of Growth Controls, 465 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 123 (1983).
114. Worth, 422 U.S. at 502-08.
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It is not hard to determine what the Court is actually doing in
cases like Warth, and why. The Court looks first at the potential
consequences of federal judicial intervention in the class of disputes at issue on the grounds asserted by the plaintiffs. In Warth,
the Court was asked to make federal district courts available to
determine which local zoning and land-use restrictions impose such
a disproportionately high burden on poor people that they violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court's reluctance to authorize federal judicial intervention in this
area of government activity on this basis is understandable. Almost
every community in the country has a wide variety of zoning and
land-use restrictions. Most of those restrictions have adverse effects
on the availability of low-cost housing in the community. Some
combination of arguably legitimate governmental purposes justifies
each such restriction. Authorizing (or, more realistically, requiring)
the federal judiciary to determine which of hundreds of thousands
of zoning and land-use rules are consistent with some (as yet undevised) test enforcing the Equal Protection Clause would impose
extraordinary burdens on local governments and the federal courts.
Moreover, any meaningful test would place each federal district
judge in a position to exercise significant discretionary judgment
with respect to a wide range of policy disputes that politically
accountable local institutions traditionally resolve. It is not at all
surprising that the Court decided to preclude this result by applying a combination of standing tests that no one can ever satisfy.
The Court has taken a completely different approach to standing in the second category of cases-those involving statutory
standing. When a plaintiff relies on a statute as the basis for its
standing claim, the Court has consistently resolved the standing
issue in accordance with its interpretation of congressional intent."5 In this context, the Court routinely has found sufficient
injuries that it would have characterized as unduly "abstract" or
"generalized" in the context of broad constitutional challenges to
classes of government actions where no statute authorizes federal
courts to entertain the disputes. In concluding that these forms of

115. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 347 (1984); Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372-79 (1982); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, 438 U.S. 59, 75-77 (1978); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,
208-11 (1972); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-58
(1970); FCC v. Sander Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1940).
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injury are sufficient, the Court often refers to the unassailable
principle that Congress can create by statute a legal right the violation of which constitutes a judicially cognizable injury." 6
In the statutory standing context, the Court also routinely has
accepted as adequate causal relationships between the challenged
agency action and the injury alleged that fall well short of the particularized certainty the Court has demanded when no statute
bears on the standing issue. For example, in statutory standing
cases, causal relationships that are logically plausible, general, and
inherently probabilistic in nature routinely suffice to create standing."7 The Court routinely has accepted as adequate plausible
allegations that agency action is likely to have an adverse economic effect on individuals or firms in the plaintiff's class."' In a
nonstatutory standing case, however, the Court would reject such a
causal relationship as "conjectural." In the statutory standing context, the Court has never required plaintiffs to "prove" that the
agency action would have an "actual or imminent," "concrete and
particularized" adverse economic effect on a specific individual or
firm.

In a high proportion of statutory standing cases that the federal courts now routinely review, no prospective plaintiff could meet
the extraordinary burden of proof required in the nonstatutory
standing context. In Association of Data Processing Service Organi-

zations v. Camp,"9 for instance, the plaintiff would, have had to
prove that a specific data processing firm would suffer "concrete
and particularized" injury attributable to the potential new competition from one or more banks which the challenged agency action
made possible. Conclusory characterizations of the injury as "generalized" or the causal relationship as "conjectural" would thwart
any attempt to meet the standard. No one can be certain which, if
any, banks will avail themselves of the opportunity to enter the

116. Se4 e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2145 (1992); Warth, 422
U.S. at 500; see also Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 208-12 (1972) (construing broadly the class

of persons able to claim injury under the statute); Hardin v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 390
U.S. 1, 6 (1968) (stating that when a statutory provision reflects a legislative purpose to
protect a competitive interest, the injured competitor has standing to require compliance

with that provision).
117. See supra cases cited notes 32-33, 43.
118. See, e.g., Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153-55.
119. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). For a fuller description of the case, see supra text accompanying note 33.
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market and which, if any, specific data processing firms will lose
revenues as a result of the competition from such banks. Moreover, the reasoning in Defenders indicates that the plaintiff also
would have to "prove" the temporal dimension of the injury-the
specific point in time at which it would suffer economic injury
attributable to competitive entry in its market.
In short, if the Court, as it suggests in Defenders, applies to
statutory standing cases the same impossibly demanding tests it has
applied in some of its nonstatutory standing cases, it will create a
legal regime in which only regulated firms have standing to obtain
judicial review of most broadly applicable agency actions. Regulated firms almost invariably will be able to establish "concrete and
particularized" injury directly attributable to agency actions. For
anyone else, the injury almost always will be characterized as
"generalized" or as the product of an indirect causal chain that is
"conjectural" or insufficiently precise and "imminent" in its temporal dimension.
Lastly, if regulated firms are the only entities that can obtain
judicial review of most agency actions under the broad reasoning
of Defenders, a series of secondary effects is likely to result. First,
the law governing rights to intervene and to participate in agency
proceedings has tracked changes in the law governing standing to
obtain judicial review of agency actions." If the Supreme Court
changes standing law to permit only regulated firms to obtain judicial review of most agency actions, the federal courts of appeals
are likely to impose analogous restrictions on rights of intervention
and participation in many of the agency proceedings that give rise
to those actions. Second, to the extent that individuals, firms, and
organizations other than regulated firms retain the right to intervene and participate in agency proceedings,"' they will experience a significant reduction in the efficacy of their efforts to persuade the agency. In a world in which agencies can predict with
confidence that every decision unfavorable to regulated firms will
be subjected to judicial review and that no decision unfavorable to
unregulated firms is reviewable, they inevitably will begin to act in

120. Se e.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994, 1000-04 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See generally PIERCE ET AL, supra note 11, § 5.5.1 (describing the expansion of eligibility to intervene as an interested party).

121. In rulemaking, the Administrative Procedure Act confers participation rights on
all "interested persons." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988).
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accordance with this new incentive structure. Groups and individuals whose interests conflict with those of regulated firms will soon
discover that their views are not considered as seriously as the
views of regulated firms because only regulated firms can impose
on agencies the substantial costs, uncertainties, and delays that
attend judicial review. As a result, groups other than regulated
firms will decrease the scope and degree of their participation in
agency proceedings significantly. This, in turn, will yield ideal
conditions for growth in the degree to which regulatees can "capture" their regulatory agencies.' As agencies hear and consider
only the views of the firms they regulate, their actions will begin
to reflect a myopic view of the world.
The phenomenon of "capture" is a version of the phenomenon the Framers called "factionalism."'" If the Court applies the
broad reasoning in Defenders in all future statutory standing cases,
it will have maximized the potential growth of the political pathology the Framers most feared and strived to minimize.
III.

JUSTICE SCALIA'S "AGENDA"

I suspect Dean Nichol is correct in drawing the inference that
Justice Scalia's opinion in Defenders is part of a "broad
agenda." 4 However, it is important to recognize the nature of
that agenda. Justice Scalia's opinion cannot be considered part of
an agenda to reduce the role of the judiciary in government
policymaking.
The Court embarked on the agenda of reducing the judicial
role in government policymaking in 1972, well before Justice
Scalia's time. That agenda has garnered support from every Justice
who has served over the last two decades, and many of the critical
opinions issued as part of the agenda were unanimous. In 1972
and 1973, the Court held that the statutory term "hearing" did not
necessarily mandate formal rulemaking procedures,"z thereby according agencies broad discretion to choose decisionmaking proce-

122. See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 86-90 (1955); PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY

AGENCIES 8-21 (1981); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1684-87 (1975).
123. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).

124. Nichol, supra note 1, at 1166.
125. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 240-41 (1973).
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dures and reducing the discretion of federal courts to set aside
agency actions based upon judicial preferences concerning the nature of the "hearing" appropriate to various circumstances. The
Court took a larger step in the same direction in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,1" holding unanimously that courts lack the power to compel
agencies to use procedures beyond those statutorily or constitutionally required.lV In a series of cases decided between 1974
and 1979, the Court established that only Congress can create a
private right of action for violating an agency-administered statute," thereby eliminating the cacophony and institutional conflicts that had resulted from the Court's prior willingness to allow
judges to imply private rights of action in the absence of evidence
that Congress intended to create such rights. In 1983, the Court
unanimously held that reviewing courts must defer to agency resolutions of policy disputes, 29 thereby attempting to eliminate the
widespread judicial tendency to characterize policy disputes as issues of fact and then to set aside the agency's "findings" because
of the scientific uncertainty that surrounds all policy disputes. In
1984, the Court unanimously held that reviewing courts must acquiesce in reasonable agency constructions of ambiguous statutory
provisions,"s thereby eliminating the widespread practice of judicial resolution of policy disputes in the guise of attributing to
Congress an intent to resolve a policy issue Congress did not address. In a series of opinions handed down between 1979 and
1988,"' the Court reduced the strength and scope of the pre-

sumption of reviewability of agency action, thereby precluding
courts from undertaking a role in government policymaking in

126. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
127. Id. at 549 n.21.
128. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414

U.S. 453, 457-59 (1974); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78--79 (1975); Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979).
129. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S.
87, 97 (1983).
130. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
131. Southern Ry. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 454 (1979);
Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1984); Heckler v. Chancy, 470
U.S. 821, 828-35 (1985); ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 278-80
(1987); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601-02 (1988).
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contexts in which there is reason to believe that Congress intended

no judicial role.
I applaud each of these decisions and the broad agenda of
which they are a part. A few ill-considered Supreme Court decisions handed down during the period from 1964 to 1971132 had
encouraged many judges to assume a role in government

policymaking that was wholly inconsistent with their status as the
least politically accountable government officials. Judge Leventhal's
famous (or infamous) characterization of the judiciary as the "partner" of the agencies whose actions it reviews133 illustrates well
the unhealthy extent to which judges felt free to second-guess the
politically accountable agencies' policy decisions.
-Indeed, the Court should move to complete this broad agen-

da. By applying the requirement of "reasoned decisionmaking" the
Court legitimated in 1983,1" reviewing courts continue to intrude
inappropriately in government policymaking. Courts frequently rely
on this open-ended and infinitely malleable requirement to secondguess agency policies that judges dislike, and to impose demands
for encyclopedic analysis of issues and options that no agency can
satisfy. 135 The Court should place further boundaries on this increasingly destructive doctrine in order to deossify the agency
policymaking process."

132. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964) (implying private
right of action for violation of agency-administered statute in absence of any evidence
that Congress intended to create such a private right of action); Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411 (1971) (announcing strong presumption of reviewability of agency actions and instructing courts to engage in "searching and careful"
inquiry into factual support for agency actions).
133. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 848-49 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
134. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-44
(1983).
135. See JERRY L MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTo SAFETY (1990); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN.
L. REV. 363 (1986); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended
Effects of Judicial Review of Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the
Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1991); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two
Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and
Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE LJ. 300.
136. The Court has reduced the scope of this doctrine to some extent. See Mobil Oil
Exploration and Producing S.E. v. United Distribution Cos., 111 S. Ct. 615, 627 (1991);
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 646-49 (1990). See generally
PIERCE Er A., supra note 11, § 6.4.6b ("Excessively demanding judicial review has
").
slowed the pace of rulemaking at all agencies . .
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The Court's decisions denying standing prior to Defenders also
can be characterized as part of its broad agenda to reduce the role
of judges in government policymaking. Much of the language of
the Constitution is so protean that it fairly can be interpreted to
authorize judges to exercise significant discretion with respect to
virtually every aspect of government policy. The Tenth Amendment provides a particularly good illustration of the extraordinarily
broad role federal judges could take in policymaking if the Court
were to authorize federal courts to review all government policies
through interpretation and application of all provisions of the
Constitution. It is hard to imagine what our legal landscape would
look like if each of over eight hundred federal judges had the
discretion, and arguably the obligation, to determine which powers
are "reserved to the states, respectively, or to the people."'3 7 The
Court was wise to preclude this result in 1923,13' even though its
choice of standing as the doctrinal vehicle to achieve it was unfortunate.
The majority opinion in Defenders, however, cannot be characterized as part of the Court's agenda to reduce the role of the
judiciary in government policymaking. It differs from the Court's
prior opinions not in degree, but in kind. All of the Court's prior
opinions are consistent with the principle of legislative supremacy.'
Thus, for instance, the Court has distinguished clearly
among: the judicial obligation to compel agencies to use statutorily
mandated procedures, and the lack of judicial discretion to require
agencies to use judicially preferred procedures not required by
statute;
the judicial obligation to entertain statutorily created
private rights of action for alleged violations of agency administered statutes, and the lack of judicial discretion to imply private
rights of action that Congress did not create;' the judicial obligation to set aside agencies' statutory interpretations that are inconsistent with congressional resolutions of policy disputes, and the
absence of judicial discretion to attribute to Congress resolutions

137. U.S CONST. amend. X.
138. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 483 (1923).
139. For an excellent discussion of the importance of the principle of legislative supremacy, see Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78

GEo. L.J. 281 (1989).
140. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council,

Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546-49 (1978).
141. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979).
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of policy issues Congress did not address;142 and, the judicial obligation to review agency actions Congress intended to subject to
judicial review, and the lack of judicial discretion to review agency
actions affecting statutory rights when Congress evidenced intent
that courts not review those actions."
The Court's prior decisions denying standing also were entirely consistent with the principle of legislative supremacy. In the
absence of a statute relevant'to the standing issue, the Court often
declined to authorize judicial intervention in an area of government policymaking at the behest of an individual who asserted
only a "generalized grievance" or whose only injury could be
characterized as "abstract" or "conjectural." 1 " When the Court
addressed standing issues in a context in which one or more statutes provided the basis for inferences about congressional intent
on standing, the Court resolved the standing dispute in accordance
with its interpretation of congressional intent.145 Before Defenders, the Court used malleable characterizations of injury, causality,
and redressability to. further its broad project of reducing judicial
involvement in government policymaking, but it used that characterization process in a manner consistent with the principle of
legislative supremacy.
The majority opinion in Defenders transposes a doctrine of
judicial restraint into a judicially enforced doctrine of congressional
restraint. That changes completely the nature of the "broad
agenda" that the opinion furthers. The case for judicial restraint is
controversial, but is supported by reasoning that is consistent with
the form of government we have chosen. 1" It can be stated in
simple terms that everyone understands and that many accept. In
a constitutional democracy, politically accountable officers and institutions should have the dominant policymaking roles, subject
only to judicially imposed limits that are firmly anchored in the
Constitution.

142.

See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

837, 842-43 (1984).
143. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600-01 (1988).
144. See supra cases cited notes 94, 111.
145. See supra cases cited note 43.
146. See generally BICKEL, supra note 100; JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRusT. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw (1980).
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The majority opinion in Defenders is simply inconsistent with
the principle of judicial restraint. The reasoning in the opinion
reallocates power among the institutions of government in three
related ways. First, in authorizing, indeed requiring, judges to
choose whether to characterize a particular form of injury or causal relationship in a manner that permits the judge to enforce or
not to enforce a particular statutory command, it gives courts
discretion to decide which congressional policy decisions bind
agencies. Judges are more likely to choose characterizations that
result in judicial enforcement of a congressional policy decision
when they agree with the policy reflected in the statute than when
they disagree with that policy. Second, it confers on agencies discretion to ignore many congressional policy decisions. Indeed, extended to its logical limit, the reasoning of the opinion could confer on agencies discretion to ignore all statutory commands or prohibitions that regulated firms prefer they ignore. Third, it takes
from Congress the power to make many judicially enforceable
policy decisions. Again, carried to its logical limit, the reasoning in
Defenders could preclude Congress from making any judicially
enforceable policy decisions that have the effect of benefiting only
groups rather than identifiable individuals.
The issue on the merits in Defenders makes the case a poor
vehicle for illustrating the potential effects of the broad reasoning
in the majority opinion. Defenders was not a case in which an
agency acted in a manner inconsistent with a clear statutory command. The only Justice who reached the merits concluded that the
agency rule was valid because Congress did not intend the Endangered Species Act to have extraterritorial effect.147 Suppose, however, that Congress amends the statute to reflect a clear and explicit policy decision that the Act is to have extraterritorial effect;
for example, "no federal agency may provide funds for a project
in another country if the Department of the Interior determines
that the project would violate the substantive provisions of this
statute, and every agency must consult with the Department to
obtain such a determination before it can provide funds for any
project in another country." The broad reasoning of the majority
opinion would still yield a holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to enforce this clear and explicit congressional policy decision
147. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2149-50 (1992) (Kennedy and

Souter, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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because no agency violation of the statute can produce a cognizable form of injury through a cognizable causal sequence.
The majority opinion is not part of a broad agenda of judicial
restraint. If it is part of a broad agenda, that agenda is the evisceration of the principle of legislative supremacy. Perhaps a case
can be made in support of such an agenda, but I have not seen a
convincing argument to that effect. Congress is a politically accountable institution. Courts should enforce its policy decisions
against agencies.

